The Complainant, a company incorporated as private limited by shares, having a registered office situated in England and Wales under the Register of Companies for England and Wales (Company number 09380523) changed its name to IGNITION TECHNOLOGY LTD on January 15, 2015.
With a corporate website accessible from its corporate domain name <ignition-technology.com>, the Complainant specialises in the discovery and distribution of innovative, next-generation IT security and networking solutions. It allows channel partners to architect solutions that better protect their customers, with access to new technology, services and Ignition’s technical expertise. The Complainants team rigorously researches, identifies and tests the latest solutions to help partners add new revenue streams and reach new customers. Its website at www.ignition-technology.com has been publicly accessible at least since March 2015 according to public web archives, and the domain name was created in January 2015 when it was first incorporated, according to public Whois records.
Complainant was named as RiskIQ's first European channel partner shortly after commencing operations, and has been featured on RiskIQ's website ever since. RiskIQ is the recognized leader in attack surface management. The Complainant has been featured on many of its partners' websites since 2015, has appeared in numerous press releases issued by vendors it has partnered with, and when it does add a company to its portfolio, it is picked up by industry trade publications related to its niche space. Last November, a joint press release with Cisco's Duo Security appeared in one of the world's largest newswire distribution networks.The Complainant made the 2019 Shortlist - CRN Channel Awards as Cloud Distributor of the Year.
The Complainant states, that the disputed domain name was registered and used to scam Complainant customers through Business E-mail Compromise (BEC).
Complainant points out, that the disputed domain name is substantially indistinguishable from Complainant's corporate name IGNITION TECHNOLOGY and their domain name <ignition-technology.com>. It is deliberately intended to appear as the legitimate domain name of Complainant by omitting a letter in the descriptive word "technology," so that e-mails sent from the domain name that is subject of the Complaint appear to be originating from the legitimate domain name of Complainant, which Ignition Technology naturally uses for communicating with its customers continuously since 2015 prior to when the domain name subject of the Complaint was first created (registered). Look alike domain names illegitimately targeting a company for BEC are of course considered to be registered and used in bad-faith under the Policy.
Respondent targeted the finance administrator of one of Complainant's customers by impersonating Complainants accounting to send a spoofed invoice of Complainant with banking details for Respondent, so that funds intended for Complainant would be sent to Respondent instead. Complainant had asked the finance administrator for one of its customers on August 8 for a status update on a payment due shortly, and four days later, Respondent sent a targeted e-mail from the substantially indistinguishable domain name subject of the Complaint in the name of the specific accountant of Complainant with whom the specific finance administrator at Complainant's customer had been communicating: "I just realised I did not update our invoice as we have recently updated our banking details, could you please view the attached invoice and update our new Barclays banking details to your system for the upcoming payment." On August 22, when the accountant of Complainant followed-up with its customer's finance administrator on the statement of account, Complainant learned that its customer had mistakenly fallen victim to the BEC scam, and sent in excess of £53,000.00 to an account number provided by Respondent in an e-mail sent from the disputed domain name impersonating Complainant's accountant with whom its customer had been communicating.
In the view of Complainant it is widely accepted that particularly considering the global nature of the Internet and Domain Name System, the fact that a complainant's unregistered name or mark has become associated with a single source of origin only in particular market niche does not prevent a complainant from establishing relevant rights for purposes of standing under the UDRP.
When a complainant can establish a look-a-like domain name was registered and used for BEC, the very fact that a respondent is shown to have been targeting the complainant’s name or mark, in and of itself, is strong evidence in support of the complainant's standing under the first element of the Policy: The respondent's harmful BEC operation or campaign itself relies on the look-a-like-domain, in this case substantially indistinguishable from its business name and mark, to deceptively serve as an indicator that the scam e-mails are in fact being transmitted from the complainant as a single source of origin.
This reliance is precisely because the look-a-like domain name resembles in fact, a name or mark associated exclusively with complainant by the targeted victims. This strong evidence of secondary meaning combined with the goodwill in its corporate name built up through continuous use over years, including continuous use of its own domain name incorporating its trade name since 2015, media recognition, and promotional material and advertising including by its partner vendors, is more than adequate for purposes of establishing unregistered rights for UDRP standing against a domain registered and used for BEC.
Complainant further states, that the disputed domain name is substantially indistinguishable (and certainly confusingly similar as evidenced by the actual confusion of record) to Complainant's incorporated business name, corporate domain name, website, and unregistered rights in its name and/or mark, and was registered in bad-faith to defraud Complainant's customers, and unfortunately, was successfully used for such purposes. Since that time, the domain name has been suspended as evidenced by the fact it has been placed on HOLD status by the registrar but just because a site or domain name is currently suspended at the time of submission of a UDRP complaint does not mean a domain was not registered and used in bad faith under the Policy.
Finally the Complainant states that the essence of the wrongdoing in this case is so harmful and obviously bad-faith that to point out that Respondent masked his or her identity in a layered onion seems to almost trivialise the scam itself, but that said, false contact information supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, which is present here as there is no person named "Accounts ." Thus Respondent did not use a proxy for legitimate purposes but to mask its false identity, which supports bad faith registration and use.
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