

## Decision for dispute CAC-UDRP-104428

Case number CAC-UDRP-104428

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Domain names arcelromiittal.com

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### Case administrator

Organization Iveta Špiclová (Czech Arbitration Court) (Case admin)

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### Complainant

Organization ARCELORMITTAL (SA)

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### Complainant representative

Organization NAMESHIELD S.A.S.

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### Respondent

Name michael scout

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#### OTHER LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

The Panel is not aware of any other legal proceedings which are pending or decided and which relate to the disputed domain name.

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#### IDENTIFICATION OF RIGHTS

The Complainant is the owner of the international trademark n° 947686 ARCELORMITTAL® registered on August 3, 2007.

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#### FACTUAL BACKGROUND

##### FACTS ASSERTED BY THE COMPLAINANT AND NOT CONTESTED BY THE RESPONDENT:

The Complainant states that it is the largest steel producing company in the world and is the market leader in steel for use in automotive, construction, household appliances and packaging with 71.5 million tonnes crude steel made in 2020. It holds sizeable captive supplies of raw materials and operates extensive distribution networks. It has an international reputation and in its niche it is well-known as attested to by earlier UDRP Panels entering awards transferring infringing domain names to its account. As ARCELORMITTAL® is exclusively associated with Complainant, and as Respondent has appropriated it for an unauthorized purpose, it lacks rights or legitimately interests in the disputed domain name and its registration is abusive and in violation of the UDRP.

Complainant contends that the disputed domain name <arcelromiittal.com> is confusingly similar to its Complainant's

trademark ARCELORMITTAL® and its domain name <arcelormittal.com> as it includes the Complainant's trademark in its entirety, albeit with typographical errors. The obvious misspelling of the Complainant's trademark ARCELORMITTAL®, i.e. the reversal of the letters "O" and "R" and the addition of a second letter "i" is characteristic of a Typosquatting practice intended to create confusing similarity between the Complainant's trademark and the disputed domain name. Previous panels have found that slight spelling variations do not prevent a domain name from being confusingly similar to the Complainant's trademark. See WIPO Case No. D2020-3457, ArcelorMittal (Societe Anonyme) v. Name Redacted <arcelormlital.com> ("As the disputed domain name differs from the Complainant's trademark by just two letters, it must be considered a prototypical example of typosquatting – which intentionally takes advantage of Internet users that inadvertently type an incorrect address (often a misspelling of the complainant's trademark) when seeking to access the trademark owner's website. WIPO Overview 3.0 at section 1.9 states that "[a] domain name which consists of a common, obvious, or misspelling of a trademark is considered by panels to be confusingly similar to the relevant mark for purposes of the first element.").

Complainant further contends that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name and taking into account the totality of evidence presented demonstrates that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith.

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#### PARTIES CONTENTIONS

The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant's contentions and did not submit any arguments or evidence in its defence. In such event, UDRP Rule 14 provides (a) that the "Panel shall proceed to a decision on the complaint" and (b) that "the Panel shall draw such inferences therefrom as it considers appropriate." In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at section 4.3. In such event, UDRP Rule 14 provides (a) that the "Panel shall proceed to a decision on the complaint" and (b) that "the Panel shall draw such inferences therefrom as it considers appropriate." In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at Para. 4.3: "Further to paragraph 14(b) of the UDRP Rules however, panels have been prepared to draw certain inferences in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the case e.g., where a particular conclusion is prima facie obvious, where an explanation by the respondent is called for but is not forthcoming, or where no other plausible conclusion is apparent."

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#### RIGHTS

The Complainant has, to the satisfaction of the Panel, shown the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights (within the meaning of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy).

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#### NO RIGHTS OR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS

The Complainant has, to the satisfaction of the Panel, shown the Respondent to have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name (within the meaning of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy).

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#### BAD FAITH

The Complainant has, to the satisfaction of the Panel, shown the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith (within the meaning of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy).

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#### PROCEDURAL FACTORS

The Panel is satisfied that all procedural requirements under UDRP were met and there is no other reason why it would be inappropriate to provide a decision.

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Pursuant to the Policy, paragraph 4(a), a complainant must prove each of the following to justify the transfer of a domain name:

- ((i) the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights;
- ((ii) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
- ((iii) the respondent has registered and is using the domain name in bad faith.

In this case, the Czech Arbitration Court has employed the required measures to achieve actual notice of the Complaint to the Respondent, and the Respondent was given a fair opportunity to present its case and defend its registration of <arcelromiittal.com> the subject domain name.

By the Rules, paragraph 5(c)(i), it is expected of a respondent to: "[respond specifically to the statements and allegations contained in the complaint and include any and all bases for the Respondent (domain name holder) to retain registration and use of the disputed domain name ...]" Notwithstanding Respondent's default, however, Complainant is not relieved from the burden of establishing its claim. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, 3.0, § 4.3: "Noting the burden of proof on the complainant, a respondent's complainant is deemed to have prevailed; a respondent's default is not necessarily an admission that the default (i.e., failure to submit a formal response) would not by itself mean that the complainant's claims are true." However, if a complainant's adduced evidence supports any element of the Policy, a respondent has an opportunity to contest the contention that its registration of the challenged domain name was unlawful. Here, Respondent has not availed itself of contesting the evidence, and for the reasons further explained the Panel finds that the disputed domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith.

#### A. Identical or confusingly similar, §4(a)(i).

This first limb of the Policy requires Complainant to prove that it has a trademark right and that the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to that mark. The Panel finds that Complainant has demonstrated that it has a registered trademark right to the term ARCELORMITTAL. Having established that element of the Policy the next question is whether the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant's mark. A side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the ARCELORMITTAL trademark indicates that <arcelromiittal.com> is confusingly similar to the mark in that the mark is easily recognized in the disputed domain name, albeit misspelled. At the threshold it is necessary only to consider "whether a domain name is similar enough in light of the purpose of the Policy to justify moving on to the other elements of a claim for cancellation or transfer of a domain name." The Panel in *Nicole Kidman v. John Zuccarini, d/b/a Cupcake Party*, D2000-1415 (WIPO January 23, 2001) notes that "numerous prior panels have held [the purposes of the Policy are satisfied] when a domain name wholly incorporates a complainant's registered mark." Similarly, *Magnum Piering, Inc. v The Mudjackers and Garwood S. Wilson, Sr.*, D2000-1525 (WIPO January 21, 2001). Panelists generally disregard the top-level suffixes as functional necessities, thus the top-level extension is irrelevant in determining the issue under the first requirement of the Policy.

Having demonstrated that <arcelromiittal.com> is confusingly similar to Complainant's ARCELORMITTAL trademark the Panel finds Complainant has satisfied Para. §4(a)(i) of the Policy.

#### B. Rights and legitimate interests, Para. 4(a)(ii)

Under paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy, a complainant has the burden of establishing that a respondent lacks rights or

legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name, but this burden is light. It is sufficient in the first instance for Complainant to proffer a prima facie case, and if the evidence presented is conclusive or yields a positive inference that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden shifts to Respondent to rebut the allegations. This concept of shifting burdens is clearly explained in *Croatia Airlines d.d. v. Modern Empire Internet Ltd.*, Case Number D2003-0455 in which the Panel held that "[s]ince it is difficult to prove a negative ... especially where the Respondent, rather than complainant, would be best placed to have specific knowledge of such rights or interests—and since Paragraph 4(c) describes how a Respondent can demonstrate rights and legitimate interests, a Complainant's burden of proof on this element is light."

Once the complainant makes such a prima facie which it has succeeded in doing her showing, "the burden of production shifts to the respondent, though the burden of proof always remains on the complainant. If the respondent fails to come forward with evidence rebutting the prima facie case or showing rights or legitimate interests, the complainant will have sustained its burden under the second element of the UDRP," *Malayan Banking Berhad v. Beauty, Success & Truth International*, Case Number D2008-1393. Finally, "in the absence of direct evidence, complainant and the panel must resort to reasonable inferences from whatever evidence is in the record," *Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Domain For Sale VMI*, Case Number D2000-1195.

In this case, Complainant contends that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, because the Respondent has no permission to use the ARCELORMITTAL trademark and in fact is not using the disputed domain name. Further, the evidence in the record is conclusive that Respondent Michael Scout is not commonly known under the disputed domain name. See *Skechers U.S.A., Inc. and Skechers U.S.A., Inc. II v. Chad Moston / Elite Media Group*, Case Number FA 1804001781783 ("Here, the WHOIS information of record identifies Respondent as "Chad Moston / Elite Media Group." The Panel therefore finds under Policy 4(c)(ii) that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name under Policy 114(c)(ii)"); *Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy*, Case Number FA 1741129 (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent's use of the same). Nor is there any evidence that Respondent intends to use the disputed domain name for any protected expressive purpose.

Once the burden shifts, Respondent has the opportunity of demonstrating its right or legitimate interest by showing the existence of any of the following nonexclusive circumstances:

- (i) before any notice to you [respondent] of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
- (ii) you [respondent] (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been commonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
- (iii) you [respondent] are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.

If a respondent proves any of these circumstances or indeed anything else that shows it has a right or legitimate interest in the domain name, the complainant will have failed to discharge its onus and the respondent must succeed. However, where respondent fails to respond, the Panel must assess the record before it.

Here, the choice of the domain name is confusingly similar to the trademark. Respondent merely reverses some and adds an additional letter. This does not create a distinctive term separate from the mark, but in fact reinforces the identity of domain name and mark. Therefore, Respondent's default and its failure to rebut Complainant's evidence is particularly telling. Since there is no proof otherwise, the record supports the conclusion that Respondent lacks any right or legitimate interest as measured by the three circumstances of paragraph 4(c). See *Deutsche Telekom AG v. Britt Cordon*, Case No. D2004 -0487 (holding that "once a complainant establishes a prima facie case that none of the three circumstances establishing

legitimate interests or rights applies, the burden of production on this factor shifts to the Respondent. If the respondent cannot do so, a complainant is deemed to have satisfied paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the UDRP). Similarly in *Malayan Banking Berhad, supra*. (holding that "[i]f the respondent fails to come forward with evidence showing rights or legitimate interests, the complainant will have sustained its burden under the second element of the UDRP.").

Accordingly, as the Panel finds that the Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, Complainant has satisfied Paragraph §4(a)(ii) of the Policy.

### C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith, §4(a)(iii)

Having determined that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the Complainant must then prove on the balance of probabilities both that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith and that it is being used in bad faith. The consensus expressed in WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.1.4. is that "the mere registration of a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar . . . to a famous or widely-known trademark by an unaffiliated entity can by itself create a presumption of bad faith." Particularly probative in this case is that Complainant holds the domain name <arcelromiittal.com> and the only difference with the disputed domain name is the addition of the geographic location. Absent a cogent explanation from Respondent justifying its choice of domain name, this supports the conclusion that it registered <arcelromiittal.com.> with the purpose of taking advantage of its goodwill and reputation and committing fraud on consumers and Complainant's clients.

The Panel finds that the present case is one in which the presumption of bad faith is satisfied. The presumption is further strengthened by the strong inference of Respondent's actual knowledge of Complainant's and its ARCELORMITTAL trademark and of its intention to take advantage of its attractive value on the Internet solely for the reason of its goodwill flowing from its widely known or famous brand. Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out four nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which is evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith, although other circumstances may also be relied on, as the four circumstances are not exclusive.

The four specified circumstances are:

- (i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent's documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
- (ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
- (iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
- (iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent's website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the respondent's website or location or of a product or service on the site or location.

Of the four circumstances, the fourth most readily applies as the domain name is clearly intended to attract Internet users seeking to reach Complainant's website or purchase its products and services. The domain name in this case is passively held, but for no conceivably lawful use. *Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows*, Case No. D2000-0003; also, *National Football League v. Thomas Trainer*, Case No. D2006-1440 (<nflnetwork.com>, holding that "when a registrant, such as respondent here, obtains a domain name that is [identical and] to a famous mark, with no apparent rights or legitimate

interests in the name, and then fails to respond to infringement claims and a UDRP Complaint, an inference of bad faith is warranted.").

Further, Complainant shows that MX servers are configured which suggests that Respondent has a nefarious intent in mind that would include sending fraudulent emails. See JCDECAUX SA v. Handi Hariyono, Case No. CAC 102827 ("There is no present use of the disputed domain name but there are several active MX records connected to the disputed domain name. It is concluded that it is inconceivable that the Respondent will be able to make any good faith use of the disputed domain name as part of an e-mail address."). See also Pepsico, Inc. v. Allen Othman, Case No. CAC 102380 ("In light of the evidence presented by the Complainant, the Panel finds that the disputed domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith, including through its use in association with the configuration of email accounts (MX records). The requirements for the acceptance of a Complaint under paragraph 4 of the Policy have therefore been met.").

Where the facts demonstrate an intent to capitalize on an owner's mark in the manner in which Complainant describes and which is supported by proof in the record, the registration is prima facie abusive. Royal Bank of Canada - Banque Royale Du Canada v. Registration Private, Domains By Proxy, LLC / Randy Cass, Case No. D2019-2803 (<investease.com>. "It is clear that where the facts of the case establish that the respondent's intent in registering or acquiring a domain name was to unfairly capitalize on the complainant's nascent . . . trademark, panels have been prepared to find the respondent acted in bad faith.). See WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.8.2. The Panel finds that the Complainant has shown that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith both in general and in particular because the Respondent's conduct puts the case squarely within paragraph 4(b)(iv) as well as within the larger notion of abusive conduct. The Panel finds that Complainant has adduced more than sufficient evidence to prove Respondent's bad faith based on the foregoing considerations.

Accordingly, the Panel finds that Respondent has registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith and that its conduct firmly supports the conclusion that the registration of <arcelromiittal.com.com> was abusive. Having thus demonstrated that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith, Complainant has also satisfied paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.

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FOR ALL THE REASONS STATED ABOVE, THE COMPLAINT IS

Accepted

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AND THE DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME(S) IS (ARE) TO BE

1. ARCELROMIITTAL.COM: Transferred

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## PANELLISTS

Name	Gerald M. Levine, Ph.D, Esq.
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DATE OF PANEL DECISION 2022-04-16

Publish the Decision

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