| Case number | CAC-UDRP-108401 |
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| Time of filing | 2026-02-11 09:34:52 |
| Domain names | schelectric.com |
Case administrator
| Organization | Iveta Špiclová (Czech Arbitration Court) (Case admin) |
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Complainant
| Organization | SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC |
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Complainant representative
| Organization | NAMESHIELD S.A.S. |
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Respondent
| Name | Chandra Pulugulla |
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The Panel is not aware of any other legal proceedings which are pending or decided and which relate to the disputed domain name.
The Complainant owns several trademarks including the terms “SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC”, such as the following:
- The international trademark SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC n° 715395 registered on March 15, 1999;
- The international trademark SCHNEIDER S ELECTRIC n° 715396 registered on March 15, 1999;
- The European trademark SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC n° 1103803 registered on March 12, 1999.
The Complainant, which was founded in 1871, is a French industrial business trading internationally. It manufactures and offers products for power management, automation, and related solutions. The Complainant's corporate website can be found at www.schneider-electric.com. The Complainant is featured on the NYSE Euronext and the French CAC 40 stock market index. In 2023, the Complainant revenues amounted to 38 billion euros in 2024.
The disputed domain name was registered on January 30, 2026 and resolves to a blank page with a message „Hum, nous ne parvenons pas à trouver ce site.“ (in English: „Hmm, we can't find this site“). Further, the disputed domain name was used for phishing activity as demonstrated by an email using an email address that incorporates the disputed domain name.
THE COMPLAINANT:
The disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant's trademark as it incorporates a significant portion of the trademark, only omitting certain letters and adding the ".com" gTLD.
The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name where it does not resolve to any website content but has been used to send phishing emails.
The disputed domain name was registered and is used in bad faith where the Respondent was aware of the Complainant's trademark and based on the above-mentioned phishing activity.
THE RESPONDENT:
No administratively compliant Response has been filed.
The Complainant has, to the satisfaction of the Panel, shown the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights (within the meaning of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy).
The Complainant has, to the satisfaction of the Panel, shown the Respondent to have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name (within the meaning of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy).
The Complainant has, to the satisfaction of the Panel, shown the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith (within the meaning of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy).
The Panel is satisfied that all procedural requirements under UDRP were met and there is no other reason why it would be inappropriate to provide a decision.
The applicable standard of proof in UDRP cases is the “balance of probabilities” or “preponderance of the evidence”. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Select UDRP Questions (“WIPO Overview 3.1”) at paragraph 4.2. Further, in view of the Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of the Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains “wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations”. WIPO Overview 3.1 at paragraph 4.3. See also GROUPE CANAL + v. Danny Sullivan, 102809 (CAC January 21, 2020) (“the Panel, based on the poorly supported and conclusory allegations of the Complainant, retains that the Complainant has not prevailed on all three elements of the paragraph 4(a) of the Policy and, therefore, rejects the Complaint.”).
1. The disputed domain name is confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights
Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy is a standing requirement which is satisfied if the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark in which the Complainant has rights. Furthermore, it is not as extensive as the “likelihood of confusion” test for trademark infringement applied by many courts. Rather, under the Policy confusing similarity is commonly tested by comparing the Complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name in appearance, sound, meaning, and overall impression. See Administradora de Marcas RD, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. DNS Manager / Profile Group, 101341 (CAC November 28, 2016).
It has been consistently held that “[r]egistration of a mark with governmental trademark agencies is sufficient to establish rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy paragraph 4(a)(i).” Teleflex Incorporated v. Leisa Idalski, FA 1794131 (FORUM July 31, 2018). In this case, the Complainant has submitted screenshots from the WIPO website demonstrating that it owns registrations of the SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC trademark. The Panel accepts this evidence as proof of the Complainant’s asserted trademark rights.
Next, UDRP panels have consistently held that where the asserted trademark is recognizable within a disputed domain name, an abbreviation or a minor misspelling does not prevent a finding of confusing similarity under paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy. The disputed domain name consists of a shortened spelling of the trademark SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC in which the first three letters of the word „Schneider“ are used followed by the word „electric“. The domain name further adds the “.com” gTLD which typically adds no meaning to a domain name. Lesaffre et Compagnie v. Tims Dozman, 102430 (CAC May 2, 2019) (“the top-level suffix in the domain name (i.e. the ‘.com’) must be disregarded under the identity / confusing similarity test as it is a necessary technical requirement of registration.“). Thus, the Complainant asserts that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the asserted trademark and will lead internet users to wrongly believe that the disputed domain name originates from or is endorsed by the Complainant. Prior panels have found confusing similarity under similar fact situations. Northern Trust Corporation v. Best Developer, D2026-0505 (WIPO March 19, 2026) (confusing similarity found between the Complainant’s NORTHERN TRUST trademark and the northtrustonline.com domain name notwithstanding “[t]he abbreviation of “Northern” to “North”.).
Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has rights to the SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC trademark and that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to such trademark. Thus, the Complainant has satisfied paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy.
2. The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name
Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy sets out certain circumstances which, if proven by the evidence presented, may demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in respect of a disputed domain name.
The Panel concludes, on the basis of the Complainant's undisputed contentions, that the Respondent has not made use of the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services as noted in paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy. The Respondent has not been authorized to use the Complainant's SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC trademark, either as domain name or in any other way. Rather, the Respondent is using the disputed domain name in furtherance of an e-mail phishing scheme and to resolve to a blank web page that contains only the message „Hmm, we can't find this site“. Therefore, this Panel concludes that the disputed domain name fully incorporates the Complainant's SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC trademark and that the Respondent is seeking to defraud Internet users who receive phishing emails or who are trying to reach the Complainant but, due to the confusing similarity of the disputed domain name with the Complainant's trademark, end up at the Respondent's website instead. Past decisions under the Policy have held that such uses of the disputed domain name are not bona fide offerings of goods or services. See, e.g., Flora Food Group B.V. v. Rubina Bon, UDRP-108377 (CAC March 4, 2026) (no rights or legitimate interests found where the disputed domain name is „used to send emails to various recipients, purporting to represent Flora Food Sales UK Limited, referring to a purported invoice for a sum that the sender claims is owed by the recipient and which is a phishing email attempting to impersonate the Complainant to obtain, inter alia, the payment details of the Complainant’s customers.“). See also, DIGITAL CLASSIFIEDS FRANCE v. Cralos Ramirez Fuentes, UDRP-105639 (CAC August 17, 2023) (no bona fide use found where „the Complainant has demonstrated that the disputed domain name did not in the past, and still does not, connect to any relevant content on the Internet, but is passively held by the Respondent instead ").
Further, as the Whois record for the disputed domain name identifies the Registrant as „Chandra Pulugulla“ and whereas the Respondent has submitted no Response nor made any other submission in this case, there is no evidence before this Panel to suggest that the Respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name or that it has any trademark rights associated with the name "Schneider Electric" under paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the Policy.
Finally, it cannot be said that the Respondent has made a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the disputed domain name without intent for commercial gain as noted in paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the Policy. There is no evidence of record to show, and this Panel is not aware of any information to indicate that the phrase "Schneider Electric" is being used by the Respondent in any generic or descriptive sense. Nor does it appear that the disputed domain name and its resulting blank website are referring to the Complainant's trademark in any nominative or other classic fair use manner such as for the purpose of commentary, news reporting, grievance, education, or the like.
Therefore, the Panel finds that the Complainant has satisfied paragraph 4(a)(ii) and of the Policy and demonstrated that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.
3. Bad faith registration and use of the disputed domain name
In order to prevail in a dispute, paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy requires that the Complainant prove that the disputed domain name has both been registered and is being used in bad faith.
The Complainant submits evidence that the disputed domain name has been used as an e-mail address to send messages in furtherance of a phishing scheme. This fact leads this Panel to the conclusion that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name with knowledge of the Complainant's trademark. It has been held in prior decisions that such activity supports a finding of bad faith domain name registration. Toray Kabushiki Kaisha v. Earl Rummel, UDRP-105582 (CAC July 28, 2023) (where phishing activity has been shown, „[i]t is abundantly clear to the Panel that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name in full knowledge of the Complainant’s well-known trademark TORAY, in an attempt to disrupt the Complainant’s business.”).
As for use, the Complainant has submitted evidence that the disputed domain name has been used in an e-mail address for a phishing message stating „we don’t want any payment on the Bank of America account anymore, I will send our new account and routing number to be used for all payments going forward.“. The Complainant also submits a screenshot showing that the disputed domain name resolves to a page with no substantive content and only an error message. Such activity has routinely been held to demonstrate bad faith use of a domain name that is confusingly similar to an asserted trademark. Arla Foods Amba v. Njalla Okta LLC, UDRP-108371 (CAC March 6, 2026) („The disputed domain name was configured to create email address impersonating the Complainant’s employee, and was used to conduct extended email correspondence with third parties.“). See also, bioMérieux v. Zao admin, UDRP-106329 (CAC April 17, 2024) (bad faith found where "[t]he disputed domain name is not used for an active website but resolves to an error page."). The Panel in this case finds that, in accordance with paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy, the disputed domain name has been used in bad faith as it creates a likelihood of confusion with the SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC trademark, it has been used in connection with an email phishing scheme, and it resolves to a website displaying only an error message.
In light of the above, the Panel finds that the Complainant has satisfied paragraph 4(a)(iii) and that the disputed domain name has been registered and used in bad faith.
- schelectric.com: Transferred
PANELLISTS
| Name | Steven Levy Esq. |
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