Decision for dispute CAC-UDRP-108539

The Panel is not aware of any other legal proceedings which are pending or decided and which relate to the disputed domain name.

The Complainant is the owner of the SALOMON trademark registered and used worldwide, such as:

The international trademark n°375807 SALOMON registered since November 24, 1970;

The international trademark n°489108 SALOMON registered since July 19, 1984;

The international trademark n°526127 SALOMON registered since March 22, 1988; and

The international trademark n°940740 SALOMON registered since June 8, 2007.

The Complainant is an outdoor sports equipment manufacturing French Company created by the Salomon’s Family in 1947 in Annecy, France. It produces products, under the SALOMON trademark, for various sports markets, including trail running, hiking, climbing, adventure racing, skiing, and snowboarding in over 40 countries on five continents. The Complainant also uses the domain name <salomon.com> which was registered on January 11, 1995.

The <salomonuruguay.com> domain name was registered on May 27, 2025 and formerly resolved to a website that displayed the SALOMON graphic logo and offered for sale shoes and other outdoor sports equipment.

COMPLAINANT

The disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s trademark as it includes the trademark in its entirety and adds only the geographic term “Uruguay” as well as the “.com” TLD.

The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name as it is not commonly known by the domain name and the disputed domain name has resolved to a website that impersonates the Complainant and claims to sell shoes and other outdoor sports equipment, effectively competing with the Complainant.

The disputed domain name was registered and used in bad faith based on the Respondent’s prior knowledge of the Complainant’s trademark and the above-mentioned website activity by the Respondent.

RESPONDENT

No administratively compliant Response has been filed.

The Complainant has, to the satisfaction of the Panel, shown the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights (within the meaning of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy).

The Complainant has, to the satisfaction of the Panel, shown the Respondent to have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name (within the meaning of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy).

The Complainant has, to the satisfaction of the Panel, shown the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith (within the meaning of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy).

The Panel is satisfied that all procedural requirements under UDRP were met and there is no other reason why it would be inappropriate to provide a decision.

1. Confusing Similarity

The Complainant has established its rights to the SALOMON trademark through its submission into evidence of screenshots from the WIPO website displaying the details of its asserted trademark registrations, the earliest of which is dated November 24, 1970.

The disputed domain name, registered on May 27, 2025, combines the Complainant’s trademark with the geographic term “Uruguay” and the “.com“ gTLD. These additions to the term “SALOMON” do not dispel the confusing similarity between the disputed domain name and the Complainant’s trademark. Avast Software s.r.o. v. Milen Radumilo, 102384 (CAC, 19 April 2019) (“it is well accepted that where the relevant trademark is recognizable within the disputed domain name, the addition of descriptive terms would not prevent a finding of confusing similarity.”).

Also, the extension “.com” typically adds no meaning or distinctiveness to a disputed domain name and may most often be disregarded in the Paragraph 4(a)(i) analysis. Novartis AG v. Wei Zhang, 103365 (CAC, 9 December 2020) (“it is generally accepted that the addition of the top-level suffix in the domain name (e.g., ‘.com’) is to be disregarded under the confusing similarity test”).

Accordingly, the Panel finds that the Complainant has rights to its claimed trademark and that the addition of a geographically descriptive word thereto in the disputed domain name is insufficient to avoid a finding that it is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s trademark. Thus, the Complainant has satisfied Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy.

2. Rights Or Legitimate Interests

Pursuant to Paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy, the complainant has the burden of making a prima facie showing that the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Cephalon, Inc. v. RiskIQ, Inc., 100834 (CAC, 12 December 2014). Once this burden is met, it then shifts to the respondent to demonstrate that it does have rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy offers the respondent several examples of how to demonstrate its rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.

With reference to Paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the Policy the Complainant states that “[n]either license nor authorization has been granted to the Respondent to make any use of the Complainant’s trademark SALOMON or apply for registration of the disputed domain names by the Complainant.” The Respondent has not participated in this case and so it does not contest this. As such, the Panel concludes that the Respondent is not affiliated with the Complainant, nor is it authorized or licensed to use the Complainant’s trademark or to seek registration of any domain name incorporating the asserted trademark. Furthermore, the Registrar for the disputed domain name identifies the Registrant as “Christine Baer”. There is no evidence that the Respondent is known otherwise and its use of the Complainant’s trademark on its website does not, alone, support a different conclusion. Madonna Ciccone, p/k/a Madonna v. Dan Parisi and "Madonna.com", D2000-0847 (WIPO, 16 October 2000) (“use which intentionally trades on the fame of another” should not be considered. “To conclude otherwise would mean that a Respondent could rely on intentional infringement to demonstrate a legitimate interest, an interpretation that is obviously contrary to the intent of the Policy.”). Based upon the available evidence in this case, the Panel cannot conclude that the Respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name.

Next, under Paragraphs 4(c)(i) and 4(c)(iii) of the Policy the Panel considers whether the Respondent is using the disputed domain name to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or whether it is making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the disputed domain name. As shown by the screenshot submitted into evidence, the disputed domain name resolved to a website that claimed to offer shoes and other outdoor sports equipment under the name SALOMON. Using a confusingly similar domain name to impersonate and pass oneself off as a complainant is not a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use per Paragraphs 4(c)(i) or (iii) of the Policy. See Ripple Labs Inc. v. Jessie McKoy / Ripple Reserve Fund, FA 1790949 (FORUM, 9 July 2018) (no right or legitimate interest found where “the Domain Name, deliberately and inherently impersonates the Complainant and its trade marks.”). Here, the Complainant asserts that “[t]he Respondent used the disputed domain name to disrupt Complainant’s business and to attract users by impersonating the Complainant, as the Respondent identified itself as ‘SALOMON’”. From the submitted screenshot of the Respondent’s website the Panel notes that it displays the Complainant’s graphic logo at the top followed by images of outdoor athletic equipment, such as running shoes, and people engaged in various outdoor activities such as running and skiing. Further down the page, images of various shoes are shown and below each appears one price in a strike-through grey font followed by a significantly lower price in a red font. Finally, the bottom of the page again displays the SALOMON logo and the tagline “Time To Play”. It also shows links to various social media platforms as well as a field titled “Stay Connected” into which users are invited to input their e-mail addresses. The Complainant’s assertion that this use of its trademark is for the purpose of impersonation and competition appears well-founded and the Respondent has not filed a Response or made any other submission in this case to offer an alternative explanation for its actions. As the Complainant has made out a prima facie case that has not been rebutted by the Respondent, upon a preponderance of the evidence before it the Panel finds that the Respondent fails to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the disputed domain name under Paragraphs 4(c)(i) or (iii) of the Policy.

3. The disputed domain name were registered and used in bad faith

The Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the disputed domain name has been registered and used in bad faith under paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy. Hallmark Licensing, LLC v. EWebMall, Inc., D2015-2202 (WIPO, 12 February 2016) (“The standard of proof under the Policy is often expressed as the balance of the probabilities’ or ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard. Under this standard, an asserting party needs to establish that it is more likely than not that the claimed fact is true.”).

The Complainant first asserts that “[g]iven the distinctiveness of the trademark and the content of the website, it is clear that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name in knowledge of the Complainant and its trademarks.”. Actual knowledge of a complainant’s trademark may form the foundation upon which to build a case for bad faith under Policy paragraph 4(a)(iii).). See, Xiaomi Inc. v. Nguyễn Đức Đạt (N/A), UDRP-107237 (CAC, 12 February 2025) (“The Panel infers that the Respondent had actual knowledge of the Complainant’s rights in the XIAOMI mark at the time of registration, as demonstrated by the Respondent’s use of the mark, its offering of competing products, and the widespread recognition of the Complainant’s trademark.”). The Complainant asserts that the Respondent had knowledge of the SALOMON trademark based on its distinctiveness. However, the Complainant has submitted no evidence of its scope or reputation of its claimed trademark beyond a screenshot of its own website home page. The Panel cannot, from this very limited evidence, determine whether the Respondent must have known of the trademark based on its reputation alone. However, as noted in the previous section, the Complainant provides a screenshot of the Respondent’s website which impersonates the Complainant in what appears to be a rather suspicious offering of shoes and other outdoor sports equipment. From such directly targeting activity, the Panel finds sufficient evidence to conclude that the Respondent had actual knowledge of the Complainant’s rights in the SALOMON trademark at the time that it registered the disputed domain name.

Next, the Complainant argues that the Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith and seeks to pass itself off as and compete with the Complainant. Using a confusingly similar disputed domain name to pass oneself off as a complainant can demonstrate bad faith under Paragraphs 4(b)(iii) and (iv) of the Policy. See Harley-Davidson Motor Company Inc. v. Liu Peng et al., UDRP-106275 (CAC, 27 March 2024) (“use of a disputed domain name to pass off as a complainant and offer competing or counterfeited goods may be evidence of bad faith per Policy paragraph 4(b)(iii) and (iv).”). Upon a review of the screenshots of the <salomonuruguay.com> website provided by the Complainant, the Panel notes that the site makes prominent use of the SALOMON trademark and its associated graphic logo and purports to offer for sale, at greatly discounted prices, shoes and other outdoor sports equipment for sale. This supports the Complainant’s claim of impersonation and disruption of its business. The Respondent has not participated in this case to explain its actions and so, based upon a preponderance of the available evidence, the Panel finds it highly likely that the Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith by competing with the Complainant and seeking commercial gain through impersonation of the Complainant and confusion with its trademark, under Paragraphs 4(b)(iii) and (iv).